REMARKS

Applicants request reconsideration of the present application in view of this response. Claims 1, 2, 31 and 32 have been amended and claim 35 has been canceled. Claims 1-34 are currently pending in the present application. Claims 1 and 31 are independent claims. Support for amendments made herein may be found, for example, in paragraph [0044] of Applicants' Specification.

APPLICANTS REQUEST THE EXAMINER RESPOND TO ARGUMENTS PREVIOUSLY SET FORTH REGARDING CLAIM 2

In Applicants' October 5, 2005 Response, in addition to arguments set forth with respect to claims 1 and 31, Applicants argued the patentability of claim 2 over the Examiner's combination of Wei and Guru, and Logan, Wei and Guru. The Examiner did not respond to these arguments, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. For the Examiner's convenience, the arguments have been reproduced below. Applicants request that the Examiner consider these arguments.

INFORMATION DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Applicants appreciate the Examiner's consideration of the reference cited in the Information Disclosure Statement filed October 5, 2005.

CLAIM OBJECTIONS

The Examiner objects to claims 5, 29 and 30 under 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(c) for failing to further limit the subject matter of a previous claim. In particular,

the Examiner alleges that "coating with the absorbing material is removed from end faces of the intermediate walls," as recited in claim 5 is contradictory to the "rapid prototyping technique," of claim 1. Applicants disagree.

The Examiner has failed to consider that the additive rapid prototyping technique was involved in "producing a basic structure," but not in "coating the intermediate walls."[1] Therefore, Applicants respectfully submit that the removal of the coating with the absorbing material from end faces of the intermediate walls in claim 5 is not contradictory to the rapid prototyping technique of claim 1 because the rapid prototyping technique is not used in coating the intermediate walls. Withdrawal of this objection is requested.

PRIOR ART REJECTIONS

I. REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1, 3, 7-17, 25, 26 31 AND 33-35 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) IN VIEW OF USP 5,231,655; AND CLAIMS 1, 3, 4, 6, 7-18, 25-28, 31, 33 AND 34 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) IN VIEW OF USP 5,418,833 AND USP 5,231,655.

The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3, 7-17, 25, 26, 31 and 33-35 as allegedly being anticipated by USP 5,231,655 ("Wei"); and claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7-18, 25-28, 31, 33 and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over USP 5,418,833 ("Logan") in view of Wei. These rejections are respectfully traversed.

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[1] *See*, Claim 1, ll. 6-7 and 12-13.

A. THE REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1, 3, 7-17, 25, 26, 31 AND 33-35 SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN BECAUSE NEITHER WEI NOR LOGAN TEACHES THE "RAPID PROTOTYPING TECHNIQUE," AS RECITED IN INDEPENDENT CLAIM 1 AND SOMEWHAT SIMILARLY IN INDEPENDENT CLAIM 31.

Applicants assert that the Examiner's interpretation of the term "rapid prototyping technique," as recited in claims 1 and 31 is incorrect. It appears the Examiner maintains his previous interpretation of "rapid prototyping technique," as set forth in the August 5, 2005 Office Action.[2] In particular, the Examiner cites to M.P.E.P. § 2111, according to which "claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation."[3]

The Examiner's statement is reproduced below:

> In the present case, the Examiner interprets the 'rapid prototyping technique' to mean a technique that produces a prototype or a model for the subsequent working antiscatter grids or collimators. Consequently, any method that produces a structure as recited in the claims would qualify as a 'rapid prototyping technique'.[4]

From the above statement, the Examiner appears to apply a word-by-word interpretation of the term "rapid prototyping technique." The Examiner interprets the term based on its literary meaning, which the Examiner believes to be any kind of process that leads to a prototype or model. This interpretation, however, does not account for the context in which the word "prototyping," appears within claims 1 and 31. As the word "technique" in "rapid prototyping technique," emphasizes, "rapid prototyping," as used in claim 1, refers to a special kind of technique. Because "rapid prototyping

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[2] Current Office Action, pp. 8.
[3] M.P.E.P. § 2111.
[4] August 5, 2005 Office Action.

technique," is a technical term, well-known to a person skilled in the relevant art, a word-by-word interpretation is not applicable. In this context, "[t]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to be a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the present application."[5]

The technical term "rapid prototyping," was well-known by those skilled in the relevant art at the time of the invention as shown by the textbook "Rapid Prototyping," by Andreas Gebhart, published 2003 ("Gebhart"). A copy of some relevant sections of Gebhart was provided with Applicants' October 5, 2005 Response, and cited in an Information Disclosure Statement filed October 5, 2005. While the Examiner initialed the form PTO-1449 listing Gebhart, the Examiner has failed to consider the information set forth in Gebhart to determine the meaning of "rapid prototyping technique," to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art. Gebhart shows that "rapid prototyping technique," is not the same as "any method the produces a structure as recited in the claims."[6] To the contrary, rapid prototyping processes are processes by which 3D models and components are produced additively. Therefore, the rejections of claims 1, 3, 7-17, 25, 26, 31 and 33-35 in view of Wei, and claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7-18, 25-28, 31, 33 and 34 in view of Logan and Wei should be withdrawn because Wei and Logan, taken singly or in combination, fail to teach or suggest the "rapid prototyping technique," as recited in claims 1 or 31.

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[5] M.P.E.P. § 2111(II).
[6] August 8, 2005 Office Action, pp. 8.

II. REJECTION OF CLAIMS 2, 19-24 AND 32 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) IN VIEW OF USP 5,231,655 AND USP 6,175,615.

Claims 2, 19-24, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over Wei in view of USP 6,175,615 ("Guru"). Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection.

A. THE REJECTION OF CLAIMS 2, 19-24 AND 32 SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN BECAUSE WEI AND GURU TAKEN SINGLY OR IN COMBINATION FAIL TO TEACH ALL FEATURES SET FORTH IN CLAIMS 2, 19-24 OR 32.

As discussed above, Wei fails to teach or suggest the "rapid prototyping technique," as recited in claim 1 and somewhat similarly in claim 31. On page 3 of the current Office Action, the Examiner correctly recognizes that Wei fails to teach using a "stereolithography," as the "rapid prototyping technique," as set forth in claim 2. The Examiner relies upon Guru to allegedly teach this feature. Applicants disagree.

Guru is directed to a method of fabricating a collimator, which includes generating a computer-aided drawing (CAD) drawing of a two-dimensional collimator and generating a stereo-lithographic (STL) file or files, which correspond to the CAD drawings. The STL files are then used by machining equipment to machine out material to be removed from a solid slab (workpiece) of radiation absorbing material to form a plurality of focally aligned channels extending through the workpiece.[7]

Although Guru may arguably create a stereo-lithographic file, the collimator is not produced using stereolithography. By contrast, in Guru the

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[7] Guru, col. 3, ll. 1-12.

collimator is formed by removing material. That is, the SLT file controls the machining equipment, which removes the material.[8] Therefore, Guru also fails to teach the "rapid prototyping technique," of claim 1. Accordingly, even assuming *arguendo* that Guru could be combined with Wei (which Applicants still do not admit); Guru suffers from the same deficiencies as Wei with respect to claim 1. As such, claim 2 is in condition for allowance. For at least reasons somewhat similar, claims 19-24, and 32 are also in condition for allowance.

III. REJECTION OF CLAIMS 6 AND 18 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) IN VIEW OF USP 5,231,655 AND USP 5,418,833.

Claims 6 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over Wei in view of Logan. Applicants traverse this rejection.

As discussed above, Wei fails to teach the "rapid prototyping technique," of claim 1. On page 4 of the Office Action, the Examiner correctly recognizes that Wei fails to teach or suggest a "coating is performed by at least one of sputtering an electrolytic deposition," as set forth in claims 6 and 18. The Examiner relies upon Logan to allegedly teach this feature. However, as discussed above, Logan suffers from the same deficiencies as Wei in failing to teach at least the "rapid prototyping technique," of claims 1 or 31. Accordingly, even assuming *arguendo* that Logan could be combined with Wei (which Applicants still do not admit); the combination still fails to teach all features of claims 6 or 18.

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[8] *Id.* at col. 5, ll. 29-31.

IV. REJECTION OF CLAIMS 2, 19-24 AND 32 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) IN VIEW OF USP 5,418,833, USP 5,231,655 AND USP 6,175,615.

Claims 2, 19-24, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over Logan in view of Wei and further in view of Guru. Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection.

Neither Logan nor Wei teaches a "rapid prototyping technique," as recited in claim 1 or somewhat similarly in claim 31. On page 6 of the Office Action, the Examiner correctly recognizes that Logan and Wei fail to teach or suggest "stereolithography," as the "rapid prototyping technique," as set forth in claim 2. The Examiner relies upon Guru to allegedly teach this feature. However, as discussed above, Guru also fails to teach the "rapid prototyping technique," of claim 1, let alone "stereolithography," used as the "rapid prototyping technique," as set forth in claim 2. Therefore, even assuming *arguendo* that Guru could be combined with Logan and/or Wei (which Applicants do not admit), Guru still fails to make up for at least the deficiencies of Logan and/or Wei with respect to claim 1. Thus, claim 1 is in condition for allowance. For at least reasons somewhat similar, claim 31 is in condition for allowance. Claims 19-24, and 32 are also allowable at least by virtue of their dependency upon claim 1 and 31.

CONCLUSION

In view of above remarks, reconsideration of the outstanding rejection and allowance of the pending claims is respectfully requested.

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. 1.17 and 1.136(a), the Applicants respectfully petition for a three (3) month extension of time for filing a response in connection with the present application, and the required fee of $1020.00 is attached.

If the Examiner believes that personal communication will expedite prosecution of this application, the Examiner is invited to telephone Andrew M. Waxman, Reg. No. 56,007, at the number of the undersigned listed below.

If necessary, the Commissioner is hereby authorized in this, concurrent, and future replies to charge payment or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account No. 08-0750 for any additional fees required under 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16 or 1.17; particularly, extension of time fees.

Respectfully submitted,

HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, PLC

By _____
Donald J. Daley
Reg. No. 34,313

DJD/AMW:jcp

AW

P.O. Box 8910
Reston, VA 20195
(703) 668-8000